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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16898

-vs:MARK VON STETTINA,
Defendant-Appellant.

------

.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with rape, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1953),
as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
on December 6, 1979, in the Third Judicial District Court,
the Honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding.

On January 9, 1980,

the trial judge sentenced appellant to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years at the
Utah State Prison.

In addition, appellant was fined $500.00.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
appellant's conviction and sentence.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and Ms. Stephenson first met on the
evening of the 23rd of July at the Sun Tavern Bar in
Salt Lake City (T.18).

Ms. Stephenson had been in the

bar for a few hours with some relatives and friends, when
appellant approached her table and began talking to her
(T.23).

However, because the music was loud appellant

suggested that they go outside to talk (T.23).

Ms.

Stephenson went outside with appellant without informing
any of her companions where she was going (T.24).
Once outside, appellant asked Ms. Stephenson
if she would like to smoke some marijuana (T.25).

Ms.

Stephenson indicated that she did, and so she and appellant
proceeded across the street to a parking lot, where appellant
noticed an inclined grassy area where no one would be able
to see them (T.26,27).

They sat down together on the grass,

-and appellant produced a pipe, which they filled with marijuana and began smoking (T.28,29).

After each person had

taken a few "tokes" of marijuana, Ms. Stephenson stood up and
said she wanted to return to the bar (T.29).

Appellant,

however, grabbed Ms. Stephenson's arm and pulled her back
down, telling hef to wait until he finished smoking (T.29,
3 0) •
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After Ms. Stephenson sat back down appellant
put his arm around her, and when he finished smoking,
he asked her if he could kiss her (T.30,31).
Stephenson told him "No;·"

Ms.

however, appellant proceeded

to kiss her, ignoring her refuals, and pushing her back
onto the ground straddling her (T.31,33).

While pushing

Ms. Stephenson down, appellant placed his hand over Ms.
Stephenson's nose and mouth so she could not breathe

(T.-33.).

When Ms. Stephenson tried to push appellant's

hands away he said, "Shut up and put your hands down"
(T.34).
Frightened by appellant, Ms. Stephenson allowed
him to unbutton her blouse and to kiss her (T.34).

Ms.

Stephenson repeatedly begged appellant to stop, but he
did not stop until he heard a noise, which caused him to
sit,up (T.36).

As he leaned back, Ms. Stephenson was able

to free her foot and kick him (T.37).
by

Appellant responded

putting his hand over Ms. Stephenson's mouth and

saying, "Do you want me to kill you?"

(T.37).

When Ms.

Stephenson shook her head no in acquiescence, appellant
pulled down her pants and removed her tampon (T.39).
Then, appellant pulled down his own pants and had sexual
intercourse with Ms. Stephenson (T.40).

During this time
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Ms. Stephenson continued to ask him to stop, and she even
began to yell, during intercourse, that he was hurting her
(T.39,40).
After intercourse, Ms.

Stephenson allowed

appellant to kiss her and hold her hand because she
feared that if she did not he might do something else
(T.41).

Ms. Stephenson and appellant returned to the bar,

where she told appellant she would see him later that
evening, hoping that he would leave (T.42,43).
After appellant left, Ms. Stephenson entered
the bar, and told her brother she had been raped (T.43).
Her brother in turn told the doorman, who took them to the
office and called the police (T.43).

After the police

arrived, Officer Hagelburg took Ms. Stephenson back
across the street, where he found the discarded tampon (T.83).
Ms. Stephenson testified that she did not remember
seeing any people, from the time she and appellant left the
bar until they returned (T.25,26,27,42).

Also, the doorman,

who called the police, associated the description given
by Ms. Stephenson with appellant (T.72).

The doorman,

Officer Hagelburg and Officer Smith all testified that
Ms. Stephenson was extremely upset after the alleged
rape (T.69,70,81,87).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE P~ESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
SUFFICIENT FOR REASONABLE MINDS TO
HAVE FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant was convicted of rape in violation of
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-402 (1953), as amended, which

provides:
A male person commits rape when
he has sexual intercourse with a female,
not his wife, without her consent.
Appellant does not deny having sexual intercourse
with Ms. Stephenson, nor does he claim she is his wife.
Therefore, the only issue raised by appellant on appeal
is that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the
act of intercourse took place without Ms. Stephenson's
consent.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (1953), as amended,
provides that an act of sexual intercourse takes place
without the victim's consent in either of the following
circumstances:
(1)
When the actor compels the victim
to submit or participate by force that
overcomes such earnest resistance as
might reasonably be expected under the
circumstances; or
(2)
The actor compels the victim to
submit or participate by any threat that
would prevent resistance by a person of
ordinary resolution. . . .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Applying this standard in State v. Herzog, 610 P.2d 1281,
1283

(Utah 1980), this Court stated:
The determination of whether
consent was present or absent in any
given case is factual in nature, and
is thus a matter for determination by
the finder of fact.

Accord:

State v. Meyers, 606 P.2d 250

(Utah 1980).

The Utah Supreme Court has on many occasions
enunciated the standard by which it will review jury
findings to determine whether there was sufficient evidence
presented at trial to sustain a conviction.

In State v.

Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119, 499 P.2d 269 (1972), the Court
stated:
• . . to set aside a jury verdict
the evidence must appear so inconclusive
or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds
acting fairly upon it must have entertained
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime.
See also State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P.2d 211 (1952);
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P. 2d 212

(1957);

State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960);

State~

Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d
216

(Utah 1976).
In applying this standard this Court assumes that

the jury believed that which supports the jury verdict.
State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728

(Utah 1976).

-6-
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Respondent submits that the evidence in the
instant case, viewed in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict, is not so inconclusive that reasonable minds
must have entertained a doubt as to appellant's guilt.
In fact, the evidence shows that appellant compelled Ms.
Stephenson to submit to intercourse by force which
overcame a reasonable amount of resistance on her part,
and appellant compelled Ms. Stephenson to submit to intercourse by threatening her.

Ms. Stephenson testified that,

from the time appellant began kissing her until he had
intercourse with her that she repeatedly asked him to
stop and that during intercourse she began screaming.

She

further states that many times she tried to push him away,
and that she tried to kick him off of her.

Ms. Stephenson

testified that appellant placed his hand over her mouth and
nose making i t difficult for her to breathe.
evidence shows that Ms.

Finally, the

Stephenson continued to resist

appellant until he threatened to kill her and only then
did she acquiesce (T.30-40).

Therefore, appellant's

conduct falls within the scope of Section 76-5-406, which
establishes

tha~

he had intercourse with Ms. Stephenson

without her consent.
Nevertheless, appellant argues that he had
intercoursewithMs. Stephenson with her consent because

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

she allowed him to hold her hand and kiss her.

In

addition, appellant claims that the following factors
indicate that the act of intercourse was consensual:
the fact that there is no evidence of a weapon or a
struggle; the fact that Ms. had no apparent injuries; the
fact that she was friendly to the defendant after intercourse; and the fact that Ms. Stephenson made no outcry
or attempt to escape, even though there were other
people in the area.

Appellant's argument is untenable.

First, there is evidence that Ms. Stephenson did
struggle against the defendant.

Ms.

Stephenson testified

that she. repeatedly asked appellant to stop, and that she
did begin screaming during intercourse.

However, contrary

to appellant's assertion, Ms. Stephenson testified that she
saw no one, from the time she left the bar until she
returned (T.25,26,27,42).

Ms. Stephenson also testified

that she kicked appellant and tried to push him away
(T.34,37).

Therefore, there is ample evidence of a struggle.

Appellant's argument also ignores the fact that, having
threatened Ms. Stephenson, his conduct falls within the
scope of Section 76-5-406.
Consent.is not shown from the fact that Ms.
Stephenson consented to accompany appellant or from the
fact that she failed to resist so fervently that she
subjected herself to great physical harm in the face of a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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threat that appellant would kill her.

In State v. Herzog,

610 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1980), which is remarkably similar to
the instant case, the defendant picked up the prosecutrix
in the parking lot of a .local lounge and, at her request,
proceeded to a store, where she purchased some beer.
Pursuant to the defendant's suggestion to smoke a
marijuana cigarette, they drove to the mouth of Parley's
Canyon, where due to the lateness of night, no people
wer€ around.

Both the defendant and the prosecutrix drank

a can of beer and mutually shared a marijuana cigarette,
then the defendant suggested they have sex.

When the

prosecutrix refused, the defendant said, "dont make me
violent."

The prosecutrix then partially disrobed and

submitted to intercourse with the defendant.
The defendant in Herzog was convicted for rape and
he appealed to this Court on the issue of consent.

With

reference to that issue this Court stated:
The fact that the prosecutrix accepted
a ride from defendant, accompanied him to a
store where she bought beer for the two of
them 1 and even agreed to ride into the canyon
with him, is not legally determinative of the
question of consent.
One does not surrender
the right to refuse sexual intimacy by the act
of accE;?pting another's company, <?r even by
encouraging and accepting romantic overtures.

Id. at 1283.
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This Court went on to state:
. • . the law does not require an
individual, in the face of an open and
apparently genuine threat of violence,
to engage in detached reflection
regarding the sincerity with which it
was made, or the likelihood that it will
be carried out.
This is so whether or
not the defendant makes open display of
a deadly weapon, and whether or not the
victim makes outcry when such would be
futile, there being no one within
shouting distance.
Id. at 1283, 1284.
In conclusion, even though Ms. Stephenson did consent
to certain contact with appellant, she did not consent to
have intercouse with him as is evidenced by her resistance
and the fact that she only submitted to intercourse with
appellant after he had threatened her life.
The final assertions made by appellant are that
because Ms. Stephenson's testimony contains some inconsistencies and because it is uncorroborated it is
inherently improbable and therefore, insufficient to support
the verdict.

However, the inconsistencies cited by appellant

are peripheral in nature and they do not go to the issue
of consent.

In addition this Court has stated on numerous

occasions that a conviction for rape can rest on the
uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix.
Studham, 572 P.2d 700

In State v.

(Utah 1977), this Court stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Most crimes are committed in such
as can be effected; and that is
particularly so of this type of offense.
~herefore, the question of guilt or
innocence often depends upon the weighing
of the credibility of the victim against
that ~f the accused.
Accordingly, the
:ule is tha~ if t~ere is nothing so
inherently incredible about the victim's
story that reasonable minds would reject it,
a conviction may rest upon her testimony
alone.
secr~cy

Id. at 701.
In the instant case, Ms. Stephenson's testimony
with reference to consent is uncorroborated.
her testimony, however, is corroborated.

Much of

Appellant

testified that he went with Ms. Stephenson to smoke
marijuana and that he had sexual intercouse with her.
Officer Hagelburg stated that he found a tampon where
Ms. Stephenson told hir.t the rape took place, which
corroborates her testimony that the defendant removed her
tampon before the intercourse occurred.

From the

description that Ms. Stephenson gave the doorman, he
identified the appellant.

Therefore, Ms. Stephenson's

testimony is substantially corroborated.

With reference

to the issue of consent, there is nothing inherently
improbable in her testimony that she made substantial
efforts to resist the defendant, and that the only reason
she submitted to intercourse was because he threatened
to kill her.
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CONCLUSION
The only issue raised by appellant on appeal is
whether as a matter of law the act of intercouse with
the prosecutrix was consensual. The evidence viewed in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict establishes
that Ms. Stephenson submitted to intercourse only after
she made a substantial effort to resist

appellant,

and even then she did not submit until he threatened her
life.

Therefore, the issue of consent is resolved under

Sedtion 76-5-406, which states that intercouse is without
consent if the actor compels the victim to submit to
intercoursebythreatening her or by overcoming a
reasonable amount of resistance by force.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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